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THE APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS UNDER
SUPREME COURT RULE 304
In 1955, section 50(2)1 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act
was revised to provide a method for determining when certain
orders were appealable and which orders must be appealed in
order to preserve a party's right to judicial review.2 In 1967,
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the substance of section 50
(2) in Rule 304 which reads as follows:
If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief ate involved in
an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the
trial court has made an express written finding that there is no
just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. Such a finding may
be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on
the court's own motion or on motion of any party. The time for
filing the notice of appeal shall run from the entry of the required
finding. In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the
parties.3
'Law of July 19 1955 ch. 110, §50(2) (1955) Ill. Laws 2259 (replaced

by Supreme Court Rule 304) reads as follows:

If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an
action, the court may enter a final order, judgment or decree as to one
or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only on express finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. In
the absence of that finding, any order, judgment or decree which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties does not terminate the action, is not enforceable or
appealable, and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of an
order, judgment or decree adjudicating all the claims, rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Id. at 2259.
2 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §50 (Smith-Hurd 1956), Committee Comments at 402.
3ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §304 (1967).
Supreme Court Rule 304 has recently been amended. The original
rule is now designated as paragraph (a); a new paragraph, designated as
paragraph (b), has been added. The amendment, which became effective
Jan. 1, 1970, reads as follows:
(b) Judgments and Orders Appealable Without Special Finding.
The following judgments and orders are appealable without the finding
required for appeals under paragraph (a) of this rule:
(1) A judgment or order entered in the administration of an
estate, guardianship, conservatorship, or similar proceeding which
finally determines a right or status of a party.
(2) A judgment or order entered in the administration of a
receivership, rehabilitation, liquidation, or other similar proceeding
which finally determines a right or status of a party and which is
not appealable under rule 307(a).
(3) A judgment -r order granting or denying any of the relief
prayed in a petition under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 110, §72).
(4) A final judgment or order entered in a proceeding under
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The purpose of this comment is to examine the problems which
led to the adoption of section 50(2) as well as the difficulties
existent under the present rule.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Appellate courts in the United States, including Illinois,
have traditionally held that appeals will lie only from final orders or judgments. 4 The avowed purpose of the final judgment
rule in both the federal and Illinois courts is to prevent appellate
courts from being overwhelmed by piecemeal appeals. 5 At early
common law, piecemeal appeals apparently did not pose serious
problems to the courts due to the application of the "single unit

judgment theory."

This theory regarded an action as a single

judicial unit which had to be adjudicated in its entirety before a
judgment could become an appealable order.7 While the early
federal courts applied this theory in both actions at law and
suits in equity,8 Illinois appellate courts have for many years
recognized as final a decree which finally determines one aspect
or branch of a case.9
With the advent of modern methods of civil procedure, such
section 73 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, §73).
110A, §304 (1969).
The committee comments state that paragraph (b) was not designed to
change but to clarify existing law. Further, the committee offered the following explanation of the applicability of the paragraph.
Subparagraph (1) applies to orders that are final in character although entered in comprehensive proceedings that include other matters.
Examples are an order admitting or refusing to admit a will to probate,
appointing or removing an executor, or allowing or disallowing a claim.
Subparagraph (2) is comparable in scope to subparagraph (1) but
excepts orders that are appealable as interlocutory orders under Rule
307. Examples or orders covered by subparagraph (2) are an order
allowing or disallowing a claim and an order for the payment of fees.
Subparagraph (3) is derived from paragraph (6) of section 72 of
the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1967, ch. 110, §72(6), which deals
with relief from judgments after 30 days.
Subparagraph (4) is derived from paragraph (7) of section 73 of
the CivilPractice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1967, ch. 110, §73(7) which deals
with supplementary proceedings.
In addition to the express exceptions to 304 the committee noted that
judgments imposing sanctions for contempt of court are appealable without
the finding. Quoting People v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 191, 226 N.E.2d 6, 13
ILL. REv. STAT. ch.

(1967),

the committee explained that . . . "a contempt proceeding is 'an

original special proceeding, collateral to and independent of the case in which
the contempt arises', .. . [the judgment] is therefore final and appealable."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, §304 (Smith-Hurd 1969), Committee Comments
at 33.

4 See generally Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41

YALE L. J. 539 (1932). In Illinois the state constitution now includes the
requirement of finality for appeals. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§5 & 7.

, See, e.g., Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 162 F.2d 327
(2d Cir. 1947) ; La Vida, Inc. v. Robbins, 33 Ill. App. 2d 243, 178 N.E.2d 412
(1961).
6
See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.19, at 161 (2d ed. 1953).
7Id.
8 Id.

9 See, e.g., Sebree v. Sebree, 293 Ill. 228, 127 N.E. 392 (1920).
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as the Illinois Civil Practice Act and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which contain liberal provisions for joinder of parties and causes of action,", the number of cases involving multiple parties and multiple issues substantially increased. Multiple party and multiple issue litigation led to increased demands
for appeals at different stages in the trial. Prospective appellants
in the federal courts found that a strict application of the single
unit judgment theory often resulted in severe hardships when
appeals could not be prosecuted immediately."
In 1937, Federal Rule 54(b) was drafted to add some degree of flexibility

to the single unit judgment theory when an action contained
multiple claims by providing that the trial court:
[A]t any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a
particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction
or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the claim, may enter a
2
judgment disposing of such claim.'
With the adoption of 54(b), multiple appeals within a
given case became more frequent in the federal courts. 13 Due to
judicial recognition of the possibility of several appealable orders within a given case, appeals from partial decisions were
not new to Illinois appellate courts.' 4 However, in neither the
Illinois nor the federal courts was it certain as to what type of
orders were appealable and when such orders were appealable.
In Illinois, attorneys found difficulty in ascertaining whether a
judgment "finally disposed of one aspect or branch of a case."' 1
Attorneys in the federal courts found that the federal judiciary
had developed different interpretations of "claims." Some fed10 FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (counterclaims and cross claims), 14 (joinder of
third parties), 18 (joinder of claims and remedies), 20 (permissive joinder
of parties) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§23, 24, 25 (joinder of parties), §38
(counterclaims), §44 (joinder of causes of action) (1967).
"t See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950).
The United States Sureme Court in this case held that the dismissal
of the claims of an intervenor was a final and appealable order. Since the
intervenor's appeal came after the statutory period for appeals had run, the
court held that it had forfeited its right to appeal.
Referring to the difficulties involved in determining whether an order
was final and appealable, the Court said:
The liberalizition of our practice to allow more issues and parties
to be joined in one action and to expand the privilege of intervention by
those not originally parties has increased the danger of hardship and
denial of justice through delay if each issue must await the determination of all issues as to all parties before a final judgment can be had.
Id. at 511.
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

(1939).

'1Prior to the adoption of the rule, federal courts had recognized an
exception to the single unit judgment rule where the case involved multiple
parties. In multiple party litigation an order adjudicating a separate and
distinct claim or terminating the action except as to a separate and distinct
claim could be appealed without waiting until determination of the entire
matter. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 190 F.2d 334 (2d
Cir. 1951).
14 See note 9 supra.
1' See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, §304 (Smith-Hurd 1968), Historical

& Practice Notes at 56-91.
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eral courts equated claims with causes of action' 6 while others
held that a separate set of facts constituted a claim and that the
entire set of facts had to be appealed as a unit.', Federal courts
employing the cause of action definition reasoned that a single
set of facts might give rise to several claims.'" Those courts
using the "separate set of facts" definition reasoned that a given
set of facts constituted only a single claim. 19
Litigants in both the Illinois and federal courts often were
faced with a dilemma. If they sought an appeal, they might be
dismissed for lack of finality. However, appeals in both court
systems had to be taken within a statutory period. Therefore,
an incorrect decision by a litigant might result in the loss of
a right to appeal. As a result the appellate courts became flooded
20
with precautionary appeals.
In 1946, Federal Rule 54 (b) was amended to alleviate this
problem in the federal courts by providing that for a judgment
to be appealable under the rule, the trial court must make a finding that there is no just reason for delay. Unless this finding
was specifically made, the statutory period for appeals did not
commence to run. 21 In 1955, section 50 (2) of the Civil Practice
Act was amended to provide a similar procedure in Illinois. 2 2
Section 50(2) provided that the statutory period for appeals
did not begin to run until the trial judge had made an express
finding that "there . . . [was] no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal."' 23 Although the procedure described in
50(2) was intended to provide "an easy method of determining
when certain types of orders are appealable ... [application of
24
the section] has proved to be anything but easy.1
LACK OF FINALITY

One source of difficulty concerns the effect of the finding
See, e.g., Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 209 F.2d 802 (D.C. 1954).
The claim for relief referred to in Rule 54(b) is of course the
claim for relief referred to in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . . That is to say, the claim for relief must indicate the
existence of a cause of action.
Id. at 807.
17 See,
e.g., Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238
(4th Cir. 1952), where the court said: "A separate claim is said to be that
which is entirely distinct from other claims involved in an action and which
16

arises from a different occurrence or transaction." Id. at 240.
Is Hanney v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 142 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1944).
19 See note 17 supra.
20 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.01, at 10 (2d ed. 1966). See also
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, §304 (Smith-Hurd 1968), Historical & Practice
Notes at 586.
21 Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1950).
22 Ariola v. Nigro, 13 Ill. 2d 200, 203, 148 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1958).
23 See note 1 .upra for the entire text of former section 50 (2).
24 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, §304 (Smith-Hurd 1968), Committee Comments at 585.
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upon the question of finality. It is clear that the mere presence
of the trial court's express finding will not, by itself, confer
appealability upon an order. In addition to the trial court's
finding, the judgment appealed from "must terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause, so that,
if affirmed, the trial court has only to proceed with the execution of the judgment. ' ' 25 The order does not have to dispose of
all of the issues presented, but "it must be final in the sense that
it disposes of the rights of the parties, either upon the entire
controversy or upon some definite and separate part thereof. ' 2r
The Committee Comments to Supreme Court Rule'304 state that
although the rule is substantially the same as section 50(2),
[t]he language has been revised slightly, however, to emphasize the
fact that it is not the court's finding that makes the judgment
final, but it is the court's
finding that makes this kind of a final
2 7
judgment appealable.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING THE FINDING
Although the trial court's express finding is said to be discretionary, 28 the Illinois Supreme Court in Martino v. Barra held
that an appeal can be dismissed for abuse of discretion in making
the finding despite the presence of multiple parties and a final
judgment as to one of the parties.2 9 In the trial of this case, the
defendants, who were also cross-defendants, had obtained the required finding and had sought an appeal from two orders entered by the trial court. One order resulted when the trial court
entered a judgment non obstante veredicto after the jury had
entered a verdict for all defendants and against all plaintiffs.
The second order appealed was a judgment entered after the
trial court sustained the cross-claimant's post trial motion for
judgment against the cross-defendant? ° The appellate court
held that the judgment non obstante veredicto was not an appealable order but was a finding on the issue of liability only
leaving damages to be ascertained in a future court.", However,
the appellate court held that the judgment entered pursuant
to the cross-claim was final because damages had been stipulated
by the parties prior to the entry of judgment.3 2 It then reversed
the latter order and remanded the cause directing the trial court
25 Midstates Fin. Co. v. Waller, 67 Il1. App. 2d 437, 440, 214 N.E.2d 624,
626 (1966).

Id.

26
27 ILL. ANN.

STAT. ch. 110A, §304 (Smith-Hurd 1968), Committee Comments at 585.
28 Vogel v. Melish, 37 Ill. App. 2d 471, 474, 185 N.E.2d 724, 726 (1962).
2937 Ill. 2d 588, 229 N.E.2d 545 (1967).
30 Martino v. Barra, (7 Ill. App. 2d 328, 331-32, 215 N.E.2d 12, 15

(1965).

81 Id. at 340, 215 N.E.2d at 19.
32 Id. at 341, 215 N.E.2d at 19.
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to enter judgment on the verdict against the cross-claimant 3
A petition for leave to appeal was subsequently allowed by the
supreme court. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's
finding that the judgment non obstante veredicto was not finals'
but reversed the appellate court in respect to its disposition of
the appeal from the order granting the cross-claim. After
holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in making
the finding permitting appeal, the court explained:
The judgment as to Cities Service [the cross-defendant] was final
and, if it were the only judgment in the case, of course would
have been appealable. But under the circumstances here, to permit its appeal would be to authorize a piecemeal appeal7The supreme court then cited its earlier decision of Ariola v.
8
Nigros
which had stated that section 50(2) was aimed at discouraging piecemeal appeals in the absence of just reason. Explaining that just reasons were present here, the court said:
Here, there is to be a trial for the purpose of determining
damages with respect to Martino, Saunders and Hamel [the other
defendants], after which there can be appeals which may come
for appellate review. Appellate consideration of the Cities Service
judgment alone is contrary to the purpose and policy underlying
section 50(2). There are no circumstances present to require that
this isolated judgment be considered as a matter of justice before
3 7
the entering of appealable judgments in the related matters.
Although Martino was the first case where an appeal was actually dismissed on the grounds that a just reason existed for
delaying an appeal, the Illinois appellate court in HawthornMellody Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway
Co.38 had stated that an appeal should be dismissed despite
the finding, if a just reason for delaying an appeal existed."
Few cases have discussed what constitutes a just reason for
delaying an appeal. It has been stated that the finding should
not be made routinely but rather should be made with a view
toward avoiding piecemeal appeals10
FAILURE To OBTAIN

THE FINDING

A separate problem arises where the required finding has not
33

Id. at 343, 215 N.E.2d at 20.
84 37 Ill. 2d at 588, 229 N.E.2d at 545.
35 Id.
38 13 Ill. 2d 200, 148 N.E.2d 787 (1958).
s7 37 Ill. 2d at 595, 229 N.E.2d at 549.
38 18 Ill. App. 2d 154, 151 N.E.2d 393 (1958).
89
[T]here .. . [would be] an abuse of discretion ... in allowing the
appeal because there is a just cause for delaying the appeal: namely we
are not to anticipate the liability of the railroad [the appellant] by deciding its right to damages at the risk of a subsequent not guilty verdict in
its favor; nor to determine the railroad's right to fees and expenses
at the risk that later the third-party defendants would question on
appeal the amount of the allowance of fees and expenses.
Id. at 159, 151 N.E.2d at 395.
40 13 Ill. 2d 200, 148 N.E.2d 787 (1958).

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 3:84

been obtained but. an appeal has been prosecuted. The early
cases interpreting section 50(2) indicated a lenient attitude
where the appealed case fulfilled the requirements of the section
but did not contain the necessary finding. In Ariola v. Nigro-1
the supreme court indicated that if the trial court would enter
the requisite finding, a later appeal would be heard on the
same briefs. The case of OppenheimerBrothers, Inc. v. Joyce &
Co.4 2 even suggested that the finding was not necessary if the
trial court would have made a finding had it been called to its
attention. Later cases have indicated a more strict attitude.
In Weidler v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.4 1 the court said:
Six and one-half years have elapsed since the effective date of
the statute and we feel it is time to discontinue the procedure temporarily permitted in Ariola and O'Hara - a procedure which encourages appeals because the trial court invariably feels impelled
44
to enter the order when invited to do so by the reviewing court.
Subsequent cases have simply dismissed the appeal where
the necessary finding is absent. 45 It has been suggested that
Rule 304 might be interpreted to allow a finding after the
appeal has been dismissed if lack of certification were the only
reason precluding appeal. 46 Such an approach seems to be sound.
Dismissal means that the case is still within the jurisdiction of
the trial court; and there seems to be no reason why it could
not then make the finding. Furthermore, this approach would
not be subject to the objections posed by the Weidler court ;47
no "inviting" statements by the reviewing court need be involved.
Since the penalty for failing to obtain the trial court's finding has become potentially more severe, it should be requested
before attempting an appeal. If the trial court refuses to make
the finding, the prospective appellant may find that he cannot
compel the court to do so. Although there have been no cases
where mandamus has actually been sought, there is dictum in
one case to the effect that mandamus will not lie to compel a
48
judge to make the finding.
41Id. See also O'Hara v. Carrillo, 18 Ill. App. 2d 106, 151 N.E.2d 449

(1958).

42 17 II1. App. 2d 408, 150 N.E.2d 381 (1958).
In 1963, the First District
of the Illinois Appellate Court, the same district that had decided Oppenheimer, held that henceforth Oppenheimer would not be followed in the first
district. See American Sav. & Acctg. Supply, Inc. v. Steinhauer, 41 Ill. App.
2d 37, 190 N.E.2d 167 (1963).
4337 Ill. App. 2d 95, 185 N.E.2d 100 (1962).
4 Id. at 99, 185 N.E.2d at 102.
45 Cannon v. Thompson, 28 Ill. App. 2d 69, 170 N.E.2d 174 (1960).
46 Tone & Euvaldi, Separation of Trials and Appeals in Multiparty Ac-

tions, 1967 ILL. L. FORUM 234 (1967).

47 See text at note 44 supra.
48 E.M.S. Co. v. Brandt, 103 Ill. App. 2d 445, 242 N.E.2d 695 (1968).
The plaintiff had appealed an order vacating a default judgment against
one of several defendants. A finding was requested but refused. On appeal
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MULTIPLE CLAIMS

One of the most vexing analytical problems posed by section
50(2) and Supreme Court Rule 304 concerns the meaning of
the phrase "multiple claims. ' ' 4 9 In Ariola v. Nigro,50 the first
Illinois decision interpreting section 50(2), the Illinois Supreme
Court considered at length the meaning of "multiple claims."
In this case the parties were adjoining landowners contesting an
alleged easement in which the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking
injunctive relief and damages while the defendwnt cross-claimed
seeking identical relief.' 1 At the conclusion of a hearing befor'
a master in chancery, it was determined that the plaintiff was
only entitled to the damages he had sustained from a deprivation
of the easement. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that he was
entitled to relief by way of a mandatory injunction.
On appeal,
the defendant-appellee contended that the appeal must be dimissed since the action involved multiple claims and plaintiff had
not obtained the trial court certification required by section 50
(2) .5 The appellant argued that multiple claims were synonymous with multiple causes of action and that since both legal
and equitable relief could be sought in a single cause of action,
his complaint contained only one claim.54
The court acknowledged that section 50(2) was patterned
after rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5 and
that several federal courts had interpreted claims to be synonymous with causes of action.56 However, the supreme court concluded that the federal courts' interpretations of claims were
in a state of confusion. Quoting the committee which had
drafted section 50(2), the court declared that the section was
the plaintiff claimed that the judge had assured him that the order was
appealable without the finding. The plaintiff claimed that under these circumstances, refusal to grant the finding was an abuse of discretion rendering the order appealable without the finding. The court rejected this argument saying that:
The making of such a finding is discretionary with the trial court,
but there is no provision for review of an abuse of that discretion when
a finding is refused. The absence of the finding in such a judgment for whatever reason - leaves the judgment final but unenforceable and

unappealable.

Id. at 447-48, 243 N.E.2d at 696.
49 Although section '50(2) and rule 304 read disjunctively, multiple
parties or multiple claims, the term multiple parties has not caused serious
problems. Multiple parties have been found by virtue of intervention, Brodsky v. Brodsky, 20 Ill. App. 2d 587, 156 N.E.2d 668 (1959), or through a
third party complaint, Hawthorn-Mellody Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Elgin, J. &

E. Ry., 18 I1. App. 2d 154, 151 N.E.2d 393 (1958).
50 13 Ill. 2d 200, 148 N.E.2d 787 (1958).
51 Id. at 201, 148 N.E.2d at 788.
52 Id. at 202, 148 N.E.2d at 789.
53 Id.

54 Id. at 204-05, 148 N.E.2d at 790.
55 Id. at 203, 148 N.E.2d at 789.

56 Id. at 205-06, 148 N.E.2d at 790-91.
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drafted with the federal problems in mind and that the drafters
sought to avoid this confusion.
The language of section 50(2), as.well as the comments of the
committee which drafted it, indicate that a flexible and reasonable
meaning was intended for the claims to which the section refers.
The section itself speaks in terms of a final judgment or decree
that adjudicates less than all the claims or rights and liabilities

and upon two occasions the advisory committee comments that its
provisions are to take effect when there is a final judgment adjudicating fewer than all the matters involved.- -

The court continued its interpretation of section 50 (2) saying:
That the problems are the same whether one, or more than one,
cause of action is involved, is demonstrated by this case ... . [W]e

are of the opinion that section 50 (2) was intended to apply wherever a final judgment or decree determines fewer than all the rights
and liabilities at issue . .

.

Concluding that section 50(2) was applicable, the court held
that the order appealed from was not final because the required
certification was lacking. By way of dictum, the court went on
to say that if the trial judge would make the finding, a later
appeal would be entertained. 9
While the Ariola court expressed a desire to avoid the confusion attached to the federal definitions of multiple claims, the
Illinois Appellate Court of the Fourth District in Veach v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.60 relied on a federal decision to support
its conclusion. In Veach the plaintiff-appellant had filed a two
count complaint based upon the same factual occurrence alleging
the defendant's negligence in each count. When the trial court
dismissed one of the counts, plaintiff appealed on the theory that
section 50(2) was applicable. The appellate court dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the case involved only a single
claim. Relying upon the federal decision of Town of Clarksvile
1 the court
v. United States,6
stated that multiple claims must
be based on separate factual occurrences.
The policy under the federal rule has been against allowing
piecemeal appeals where there is only one actual claim involved.
Rule 54(b) permits separate judgments where there are separate
and distinct claims based on differing occurrences or transactions.
If there is only a single claim or "factual occurrence" involved, the
rule cannot be invoked to confer jurisdiction upon an appellate
court, and an attempted piecemeal appeal will be dismissed. 62
On the other hand, multiple counts were also involved in
Cunningham v. Brown63 where the Illinois Supreme Court held
57 Id. at 206, 148 N.E.2d at 791
58 Id. at 207, 148 N.E.2d at 791.

(emphasis added).

59 Id. at 208-09, 148 N.E.2d at 792.
80 22 Ill. App. 2d 179, 159
81 198 F.2d 238 (1952).

N.E.2d 833 (1959).

6222 Ill. App. 2d at 181, 159 N.E.2d at 833-34.
68 22 Ill. 2d23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961).
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that alternative counts based on the same factual occurrence
constituted multiple claims. As in Ariola, the court indicated a
willingness to deviate from federal treatment of multiple claims
which require separate factual occurrences to establish multiple
claims. However, the Cunningham court stated that multiple
counts based on the same facts could constitute multiple claims
if the counts expressed different theories of liability. In denying
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that only a single claim was
involved, the court said:
Although arising from the same occurrence or transaction, the
bases of recovery are different. Section 50(2) was intended to
apply wherever a final judgment determines fewer than all the
rights and liabilities in issue. We think that such is the case here,
and that it does not matter, in determining whether multiple counts
allege multiple claims for relief, that recovery under one would bar
recovery of additional damages under the others.4

Although most of the cases discussing multiple claims have
involved complaints containing multiple counts, the court in
Central Wisconsin Motor Transportation Co. v. Levin- held
that a single count complaint involved multiple claims. Plaintiff's complaint sought specific performance and damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract." Defendant appealed
under section 50(2) after the demand for specific performance
was stricken by the court, but the count seeking damages remained. Relying on Veach and federal decisions the plaintiff
argued that only a single claim was involved since his complaint
was based on a single factual occurrence. Citing both Ariola and
Cunningham the court rejected plaintiff's contention while accepting the defendant's argument involved in the following interpretation of Ariola:
Distinct sets of rights and liabilities are involved inasmuch as the
plaintiff asserts that it has the right to either damages or specific
performance and that defendant is liable either to pay money or
perform. One set 6of
rights and liabilities was disposed of by the
order of dismissal. 7
An analysis of the cases where multiple claims either have
or have not been found present does not result in the formulation
of any easily applied test. For example, multiple claims were
expressly or impliedly found in the following cases: McGee v.
McGee,6 8 a marriage dissolution, an issuance of temporary injunction, and an award of separate property and a property settlement were sought; Simon v. Simon,6 a dissolution of a part64

, d. at 25, 174 N.E.2d at 154.

65
6

66 Ill. App. 2d 383, 214 N.E.2d 776 (1966).

31d. at 385, 214 N.E.2d at 778.
67 Id. at 396, 214 N.E.2d at 783.

68 36 Ill. App. 2d 105, 183 N.E.2d 317 (1962).
69 37 Ill. App. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 111 (1962).
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nership and an accounting were sought; Cook County v. Hoytt,70
one count claiming a violation of a zoning ordinance and a separate count for nuisance; Ame:ican Saving & Accounting
Supply, Inc. v. Steinhauer'71 injunctive relief and damages were
sought; and Brenner v. Neu, 72 a mortgage foreclosure, damages
on a note and for fraud were sought.
Some general conclusions are possible, however. The number of counts in one's complaint does not seem to be determinative. In Levin a single count complaint was held to contain
multiple claims, while in Veach a two count complaint was
said to contain only a single claim. Separate factual occurrences
are apparently not needed to give rise to multiple claims. Finally,
multiple claims can exist where relief is sought on more than
one theory of liability regardless of whether relief under one
theory would preclude relief under the other theory.
CONCLUSION

Uncertainty as to the right to appeal in multiple party and
multiple claim litigation has continued in Illinois despite the existence of Supreme Court Rule 304. Since the statutory period
for appeals now begins to run only after the express finding has
been made, the rule has made certain when an order must be
appealed to preserve the right to appeal. However, once the
finding has been made the appealability of a given order remains
uncertain. Despite the presence of a 304 finding, an appeal can
be dismissed if the appellate court finds that the order appealed
from is not final or that multiple claims or multiple parties are
not present or that a just reason for delaying appeal exists. The
difficulty of determining whether a trial court order is final exists,
of course, in all areas of appellate practice. However, the appealability of orders under 304 is further conditioned by the
requirements that either multiple parties or multiple claims
must be present and that no just reason for delaying or enforceing appeal exists. Although "multiple claims" and "no just
reason" are phrases central to the understanding of Rule 304,
neither has been judicially defined with sufficient exactness to
permit trial judges or practitioners to effectively utilize the rule.
In Ariola the supreme court attempted to avoid the confusion
surrounding multiple claims that had troubled the federal courts
by refusing to define multiple claims, stating instead that 50 (2)
(now Rule 304) was intended to apply whenever a final judgment determines fewer than all of the rights or liabilities at
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issue. The "flexible" approach to multiple claims suggested by
the Ariola court has made it extremely difficult to tell when the
rule is applicable. Similarly, few guidelines have been suggested
by the supreme court as to what constitutes just reasons for
delaying appeal. In Martino the court implied that an appeal
should be dismissed when, as a matter of justice, there are no
circumstances present to require an immediate hearing of the
appeal. The decision, however, gave little indication as to when
the supreme court would conclude that such circumstances were
present. Much of the present uncertainty as to the right to
appeal under 304 could be alleviated by a revision of the rule
to clarify the phrases "no just reasons for delay" and "multiple
claims." Despite the frequent statements by the courts that the
rule is designed to discourage rather than encourage piecemeal
appeals, fairness to litigants requires that the scope of permissible appeals be more clearly defined.
Bruce C. Mackey

